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Abstract
This study examines the eﬀects of the organization type and compen-
sation scheme within a ﬁrm on the job separation decisions of working
women in the case of childbearing. Under stringent labor legislation that
secures employment, the direct dismissal of parenting women is prohib-
ited. Firms, however, deliberately introduce team production in which
the workers within a team put peer pressure on parenting women so that
these women quit their jobs voluntarily. This threat forces women to aban-
don the idea of childbearing and leads to social loss. Simple policies are
less likely to be eﬀective at turning around the ineﬃcient allocation.
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1 Introduction
Social norms often inﬂuence the job attachment of women in the case of child-
bearing. Owing to the social pressure that accompanies the role of mothers,
women are forced to be fully responsible for child rearing and, as a consequence,
are compelled to leave the ﬁrm in the case of childbearing. Although the ef-
fects of such norms diﬀer across countries, the upsurge in the job separation of
women in their 30s may be attributable to the norms in some countries such
as Japan and Ireland (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000). In Japan, for example,
about 67 percent of women with paid jobs leave their ﬁrms within six months
of childbirth (CAO 2004). Because women following these norms have to choose
either a career without children or job separation to enable child rearing, the
decision of childbearing often leads to a signiﬁcant opportunity cost.
It is noted that social norms, particularly those in workplaces, are not nec-
essarily given exogenously, but rather are often inﬂuenced by a ﬁrm’s policies
on the organization of production and compensation. In order to implement
these norms, the speciﬁc actions of workers are required such as informal peer
monitoring and sanctions against deviators. In this sense, ﬁrms may inﬂuence
the behaviors of their workers and, therefore, the norms of workplaces by alter-
ing their organization and compensation schemes. Among various organization
types, I argue that the norms in workplaces play a decisive role in the organi-
zation of team production. In team production, the compensation of workers
is mainly allocated based on team performance and this property thus provides
workers with an incentive to monitor each other.
This study describes the roles of workplace norms in relation to organization,
particularly team production, in order to draw serious policy implications for
family policies. I argue that the ﬁrm has an incentive to employ team production
in order to deliberately revert the eﬀect of strong family policies that ensure
the employment and compensation of parenting women. It is true that ﬁrms
cannot dismiss parenting women directly under employment protection laws;
however, team production gives coworkers an incentive to put peer pressure on
such women often forcing them to quit the ﬁrm. The present model also predicts
that the mere introduction of paid parental leave is ineﬀective at raising the
fertility rate in general, because such leave remains unutilized as long as informal
peer pressure continue to forces women to quit their jobs when childbearing.
In order to address the interaction of organization types and workplace
norms speciﬁcally, I construct a model that narrows the focus of the investi-
2
28
gation to two types of organization: team and individual production. In team
production, workers within a team collaborate and are able to monitor each
other. When compensation is provided on the basis of team performance as
a whole, cooperation among workers is considered to be valuable and workers
have an incentive to exercise peer sanctions against deviating workers who do
not cooperate. In individual production, on the contrary, workers complete
their tasks independently and individual performance is observable at a lower
cost.
These general properties of the beneﬁts and costs of each organization
type apply to the present model, which includes labor legislation for parent-
ing women. The beneﬁts of team production, on the one hand, are obtained
by putting peer pressure on parenting women so that they are forced to quit
the ﬁrm. Under strong employment protection laws, the employer is unable to
dismiss parenting women, and individual production involves additional costs
because of these laws. However, team production allows the ﬁrm to resort to
peer pressure in workplaces and hence to avoid these costs. On the other hand,
the costs of team production arise owing to the higher level of compensation
that the ﬁrm pays to enforce the informal activities of workers.
The ﬁrm, based on these beneﬁts and costs, chooses between team and
individual production. The ﬁrm prefers team production when the costs of im-
plementing peer pressure are lower than the beneﬁts from the indirect dismissal
of parenting women. This situation occurs particularly when workers possess
high discount factors and consequently place great emphasis on future events,
because they then take the penalty of peer sanctions seriously.
Owing to both the threat of indirect dismissal and the higher pay, parent-
ing women involved in team production are markedly discouraged from making
fertility decisions. First, the threat of indirect dismissal directly raises the op-
portunity cost of childbearing because fertility decisions are always accompanied
by job separation. Second, the higher wage compensation in team production
further discourages fertility decisions because the foregone income of childbear-
ing is higher in team production. In team production, despite the existence of
strong labor legislation, these two eﬀects result in a strong negative eﬀect on
fertility.
The negative eﬀect on fertility leads directly to welfare loss because fertility
is socially beneﬁcial. According to the socially optimal allocation in the model,
women bear children whenever they have the opportunity to do so because
child rearing is beneﬁcial from the social standpoint. The low productivity
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of parenting women during child rearing should be compensated for by hiring
substitute workers from the outside labor market. In equilibrium, however,
team production without substitute workers may be a better strategy for the
ﬁrm to reduce labor costs because it leads to the job separation of parenting
women.1 Consequently, fertility decisions are greatly discouraged, leading to
serious ineﬃciencies in team production.
The model’s implications provide a new view on recent empirical evidence
concerning family policies that aim to raise fertility rates. Although a host
of research on fertility aﬃrms the positive eﬀect of parental leave and family
beneﬁts on fertility (Del Boca 2002; Morita and Kaneko 1998; Shigeno and Mat-
suura 2003), empirical evidence reveals that the eﬀects of this labor legislation
is less clear and that these eﬀects diﬀer across countries (Gauthier and Hatzius
1997; Shigeno and Ohkusa 1999; Hantrais 1997; Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).2
Although many factors obscure the eﬀects of family policies on fertility,3 the
social norms pertaining to the role of women in child rearing appear to play
a signiﬁcant role in some countries (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000). The model
thus provides a theoretical framework that can account for the eﬀect of these
norms on fertility.
I also derive serious policy implications: the model predicts that the mere
introduction of a single policy may be ineﬀective at raising fertility. For ex-
ample, the mere introduction of mandated substitute workers during parental
leave may not stop peer pressure on parenting women. According to the model,
workers have an incentive to use peer pressure as long as the other workers do
the same, because any deviation by a single worker can result in a signiﬁcant
utility loss to him- or herself. Therefore, complementary policies are necessary
to induce the coordinated change.
The importance of coordinated changes in the behaviors and attitudes of
1It is noted that Japanese employers are less likely to provide substitute workers when
their female employees are on leave for childcare (ESRI 2005).
2For example, Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) argued that fertility in Sweden is considerably
more stimulated by changes in parental leave and wage compensation policies than in the
United States where there was almost no change in fertility in response to the introduction of
labor legislation that ensures unpaid leave for childbirth.
3Hantrais (1997) claimed that a single family policy may lead to a diﬀerent outcome when
combined with other labor legislation. In Germany, for example, maternal leave policy man-
dates a generous preleave pay; however, the eﬀect of this policy is obscured when combined
with the substantial shortage of childcare facilities and German policies that encourage women
to stay home for extended periods of time.
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workers in workplaces is often cited in empirical studies with regard to eﬀective
family policies. Several empirical studies reveal that the attitude and under-
standing of coworkers and supervisors are crucial for maintaining productivity
within a ﬁrm when some workers take childcare leave (Staines and Galinsky
1992; Eaton 2003).4 The present model provides one theoretical foundation for
these empirical results.
This study is related to the literature from several ﬁelds that unveils the
relationship between labor markets and fertility. First, the seminal works of
Becker (1991) and Willis (1973) investigated the manner in which the num-
ber of children and their education levels are determined by market wages,
which constitute a major part of the foregone income of fertility. These studies,
however, do not explicitly deal with the eﬀect on fertility decisions of the way
that production is organized. Second, job availability aﬀects fertility decisions;5
Da Rocha and Fuster (2006) explored the eﬀect of job-ﬁnding rates on fertility.
However, these studies do not explain why parenting women quit their jobs in
economies that encourage parental leave.
This study is closely related to the theoretical models of team production
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Holmstrom 1982; Che and Yoo 2001; Ishida 2009).
Che and Yoo (2001), in particular, revealed the manner in which cooperation
among team members can be achieved in repeated game settings. My model
builds on their work in order to model explicitly the interactions between the
workers within a team. In the model of Che and Yoo (2001), however, the
decision pertaining to job separation is not a viable option, although it plays a
decisive role in this study. Furthermore, the welfare implications are diﬀerent
because my model reveals that team production is socially ineﬃcient in contrast
to their models.
Peer pressure and sanctions in workplaces have been studied in various set-
tings. First, peer pressure among workers has been studied as a device for main-
taining discipline and eliciting eﬀort in team production (Kandel and Lazear
1992; Rotemberg 1994; Barron and Gjerde 1997).6 Barron and Gjerde (1997) in
particular investigated the optimal compensation scheme when peer monitoring
4Refer to Takeishi (2006) for a survey regarding the eﬀects of work-life balance policies on
ﬁrms’ proﬁtability.
5The job-ﬁnding rate is also related to labor legislation. When labor legislation strongly
protects employment, job-ﬁnding rates are reduced as job openings are costly in anticipation
of future dismissal costs (Blanchard and Portugal 2001).
6Related studies include Ito (2004), Daido (2006a), Daido (2006b), Hehenkamp and Kaar-
boe (2006), Dur and Sol (2010), Huck et al. (2012), Miller and Rozen (2014).
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and sanctions exist in team production, showing that the optimal compensation
is less sensitive to output in order to reduce costly peer monitoring. However,
their model is static, and they do not deal with the way in which peer mon-
itoring among workers is attained.7 Second, Lazear (1989) and Chen (2003)
investigated the eﬀect of sabotage, which is deﬁned as behavior that disturbs
other workers’ performance in workplaces. Sabotage is naturally an obstacle to
the implementation of relative performance compensation systems as shown in
Lazear; however, these models contrast with my model wherein peer pressure
directly aﬀects the welfare of targets and forces job separation.
Finally, research on norms in repeated game settings and harassment in
workplaces is related to my model. First, several studies have shown that the
norm or cooperation emerges as a result of ostracism (Hirshleifer and Rasmusen
1989) or reputation concern (Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite 1995) in mod-
els of repeated games. These studies, however, do not clarify the interaction
among organization types, compensation schemes, and peer pressure. Second,
harassment behaviors have been studied from various viewpoints. Sexual ha-
rassment has been investigated, although mainly in relation to laws and crimes
(Basu 2003). Harassment in workplaces is employed by Lindbeck and Snower
(1988, 1990) in order to explain the high wages of incumbent workers in an
insider–outsider model. However, the motivation and policy implications of
their models are clearly diﬀerent from those of my model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the
model and analyzes the optimal choice of compensation schemes and organiza-
tion types. Section 3 discusses the welfare and policy implications. Section 4
presents some concluding remarks.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
I extend the model of Che and Yoo (2001) to the case in which several workers
can engage in production as a team and put peer pressure on other workers.
It consists of a discrete time model in which time is denoted as t (t = 1, 2, ...).
The economy consists of one ﬁrm and many workers who are risk neutral and
who share a common discount factor of δ. The ﬁrm owns the production tasks
7In Casas-Arce (2010), the possibility of replacing the opponents is introduced in repeated
games.
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for N workers, and it is in the best interest of the ﬁrm to employ N workers
because the productivity of each task is suﬃciently high. Thus, one ﬁrm and N
workers play a repeated game in which the workers perform certain activities in
each period. The workers cannot directly enter side contracts with each other,
and negative compensation is not allowed because of their liquidity constraint.
There are two types of workers: female workers and male workers. Female
workers can bear children with probability θ in each period. In this study, I
assume that the ﬁrm needs to employ at least one female worker.
Labor Legislation 1 The ﬁrm is required to employ at least one female worker
and assign her to a productive task.
In this study, the above legislation is interpreted as some form of aﬃrmative
action or equal employment law. As clariﬁed later, the best strategy for the ﬁrm
is to employ just one female worker who has no children in the initial period.
The other N − 1 workers, referred to as male workers, cannot bear children.
The possibility of job separation plays a decisive role. Regarding this de-
cision, employment protection laws introduce a substantial cost to the ﬁrm of
dismissing its employees, and this is formalized as the next assumption.
Labor Legislation 2 The worker can quit the ﬁrm without incurring any costs.
However, the ﬁrm cannot remove any employed worker from a productive task
unless he or she approves of such a shift.
The above legislation indicates that the currently assigned task is secured under
employment protection laws. This assumption is necessary in order to make
employment protection eﬀective; otherwise, the ﬁrm may assign the worker
to an unproductive task, in which his or her productivity may be zero, and
this renders the same eﬀect as dismissal when the performance pay scheme is
employed. The workers earn a wage rate of zero outside the ﬁrm, and many
workers whose incomes are zero exist outside the ﬁrm. Because the ﬁrm pays
a positive amount of compensation in equilibrium, there exists competition
among unemployed workers to obtain productive tasks.
Each period consists of four stages whose timing is as follows:
1. (Fertility) The female worker makes the fertility decision when the oppor-
tunity arises.
2. (Job separation) The workers determine whether to leave or stay in the
ﬁrm.
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3. (Hiring) The ﬁrm decides to hire new workers or not.
4. (Production) The workers choose among production eﬀort, peer pressure
eﬀort, and no eﬀort.
In the ﬁrst stage, the female worker can bear a child with probability θ.
I assume that the opportunity to bear a child arrives independently in each
period and that once the female worker does not have a child in one period, she
has to wait for another opportunity, which arrives at probability θ in the next
period. When she has a child, she obtains a positive utility of a in each period
because of parenting activities. The childbearing activity is observable to all
the agents in the economy.
In the second and third stages, I assume that the ﬁrm can hire new workers
immediately after workers quit the ﬁrm. This assumption implies that the ﬁrm
does not incur any costs in replacing the workers, because the ﬁrm can hire
replacements immediately whenever workers leave the ﬁrm. This assumption is
for tractability, although the introduction of a replacement cost is possible.
In the fourth stage, the male workers select any one of the three actions
in each period: production eﬀort, peer pressure eﬀort, or no eﬀort. When
they engage in production eﬀort, it raises productivity, although the degree of
improvement depends on the ways in which production is organized within the
ﬁrm. Alternatively, these male workers can put peer pressure on the female
worker, which subsequently reduces her utility by h. This negative eﬀect is
stronger when more male workers put peer pressure on her. Speciﬁcally, I
assume that her utility decreases by nh when n male workers engage in peer
pressure. Each male worker incurs the utility cost of e when he engages in
either production eﬀort or peer pressure eﬀort, while the cost is zero when he
makes no eﬀort.
The choices available to the female worker in the fourth stage depend on
whether she has a child. When she does not have a child, the female worker
either engages in production eﬀort or makes no eﬀort in the fourth stage, in
which the eﬀort cost for production is e. However, when she does have a child,
the female worker is unable to exert production eﬀort, because her eﬀort cost
is considerably high during parenting activities. Therefore, she exerts no eﬀort
in this case, although she has the utility of child rearing (a) in each period.
While the productivity of the parenting female worker in the labor market
is low by design, regulations such as childcare leave laws and equal employment
laws ensure that she can return to her present job after childbirth. In particular,
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I assume that the parenting female worker can maintain the same job and
compensation in the following sense.
Labor Legislation 3 The compensation level of the parenting female worker
is the same as the expected income of the male workers.
The regulation on compensation is an extreme form of childcare beneﬁt imposed
upon the ﬁrm, and I consider this extreme case in order to obtain a clear picture
of the eﬀect of labor legislation.
The ﬁrm arranges the organization type, compensation scheme, and em-
ployment policies in order to maximize its proﬁt, and the ﬁrm makes all these
decisions at the beginning of the initial period. First, the ﬁrm decides whether
individual production or team production is the best way to organize produc-
tion. Second, it prepares a compensation schedule that minimizes the labor cost
but makes all workers exert production eﬀort. Third, it devises employment
policies that determine whether to hire substitute workers when the female
worker bears a child. I detail these three components successively next.
The ﬁrst component that the ﬁrm selects is how production is organized:
the ﬁrm chooses either individual production or team production. In individual
production, the outcome of production is realized based on an individual worker,
and the individual outcome is either one (success) or zero (failure). Production
eﬀort plays a decisive role because it raises the probability of success. In team
production, I assume that the ﬁrm creates a team of N workers.8 The ﬁrm
cannot observe the performance of individual workers; rather, it monitors only
the outcome of the team as a whole, which equals either N (success) or 0
(failure). The production eﬀort of individual workers raises the probability of
the success of the team, and I assume that this is a nondecreasing function of
the number of workers who make production eﬀort.
Individual and team production provide diﬀerent information structures; in
particular, I assume that workers can monitor the activities of other workers in
team production. In individual production, on the one hand, I assume that the
outcome is observable and veriﬁable to both the ﬁrm and the worker, although
the eﬀort level is information privy only to the worker who makes the eﬀort.9 In
8The main results remain unchanged even if the ﬁrm changes the size of the team. In such
a case, the ﬁrm chooses the minimum size of a team that makes peer pressure eﬀective.
9This assumption implies that the ﬁrm is unable to renege on the initially planned com-
pensation. This contrasts with the relational contracts of Levin (2002) and Kvaløy and Olsen
(2006).
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team production, on the other hand, only the outcome of the team as a whole
(i.e., N or 0) is observable and veriﬁable. Although the outcomes of individual
workers are not observable to the ﬁrm, information on these workers’ activities,
including their production eﬀort levels, is shared among the workers within a
team.
The second policy of the ﬁrm is the compensation plan, and this is sum-
marized by the bonus level in the case of success under the assumptions of
the model. First, I assume that the productive task is suﬃciently proﬁtable.
As a result, the ﬁrm devises a compensation plan to ensure that all workers
make production eﬀort in equilibrium. Second, I assume that the compensa-
tion contract is time invariant or memoryless in the sense that compensation
is paid based only on the outcome of the corresponding period, as in Che and
Yoo (2001). As a result of this assumption, compensation comprises the base
salary in the event of failure and a bonus in the event of success in the corre-
sponding period. Third, I assume that the workers face liquidity constraints
that make negative compensation infeasible. Because the base salary does not
give workers an incentive to exert eﬀort, the optimal base salary is zero under
this assumption. Therefore, these assumptions lead to a situation in which the
choice variable of the ﬁrm is the bonus that is given in the event of success,
which is denoted by w.
The compensation scheme is prepared in keeping with the labor legislation,
which does not allow any discrimination.
Labor Legislation 4 The workers earn identical levels of compensation when
their performances are identical in the current period.
In this sense, the compensation scheme is considered anonymous. This assump-
tion is critical for the female worker whose productivity is low in the case of
childbearing by design. I assume that the equal employment law ensures the
equal treatment of compensation for both gender subsets. Owing to this as-
sumption, the identical bonus of w is applied to all workers including the female
worker.
The third policy of the ﬁrm is the employment policy that details the em-
ployment decisions of a substitute worker for the female worker after childbirth.
First, in the case of job separation, the ﬁrm always hires a replacement, because
I assume that the productive task is suﬃciently proﬁtable. Second, when the
female worker has a child, the ﬁrm may hire a substitute worker in order to
cover her low productivity. However, the ﬁrm may not deliberately hire the
10
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substitute worker in team production for strategic reasons. This employment
strategy is an important policy variable for the ﬁrm.
The choice of organization type thus greatly aﬀects workers’ incentives. In
the following two sections, I consider individual and team production more in
detail.
2.2 Individual production
In individual production, the ﬁrm observes the outcome of individual workers,
and this outcome takes the value of either one (success) or zero (failure). The
probability of success is denoted by q1 and q0 when the worker makes production
eﬀort and no eﬀort, respectively. I assume that production eﬀort is valuable in
the sense that 1 > q1 > q0 > 0.
The ﬁrm’s compensation is decided on an individual basis because there is
no interaction between workers. The ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt by inducing the
eﬀort of all the workers, and the next incentive compatibility condition must
thus hold for this purpose:
q1w
I − e ≥ q0wI ,
where wI represents the bonus in individual production. The left-hand side
provides the value when the workers make production eﬀort and the probability
of success is then high, while the right-hand side shows the value when they
make no eﬀort and the probability of success is then low. The ﬁrm selects the
smallest level of bonus that satisﬁes the above inequality.
wI =
e
q1 − q0 (1)
The female worker decides whether to have a child or not when the oppor-
tunity arises in the ﬁrst subperiod. Although her productivity is low, a female
worker with a child has no incentive to quit the ﬁrm because her income is
secured by law (Labor Legislation 3). Thus, the female worker always beneﬁts
by bearing a child, as shown below:
wIq1 − e < wIq1 + a,
where the values on the right- and left-hand sides represent her decisions to con-
tinue working with and without a child, respectively. Thus, the female worker
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has a child for any positive level of a and continues to work after childbearing.
The ﬁrm hires one substitute worker to complete the task in equilibrium. Be-
cause such an opportunity arises with probability θ, the expected labor cost of
the ﬁrm, denoted by CIf , follows the Bellman equation:
CIf = θ(N + 1)q1w
I + (1− θ)(Nq1wI(1− δ) + CIf δ), (2)
where the ﬁrst term represents the expected total labor cost when the oppor-
tunity for childbearing arises and the ﬁrm employs N + 1 workers, while the
second term implies the expected total labor cost in other cases. By rearranging
the above equation and (1), we obtain
CIf =
( θ
1− (1− θ)δ +N
)
q1w
I ,
=
( θ
1− (1− θ)δ +N
) q1
q1 − q0 e. (3)
This equation is particularly clear when δ is one, in which case, CIf = (N +
1)q1w
I . In this case, the labor cost increases by the expected bonus of one
worker because the ﬁrm needs to hire one additional worker regardless, and the
same weights are assigned to present and any future events.
2.3 Team production
In team production, the ﬁrm is unable to observe individual performance and,
consequently, the bonus is provided based on team performance, which takes
a value of either N (success) or 0 (failure). I denote the probability of success
by pn, where n is the number of workers who exert production eﬀort (n ∈
{0, ..., N}). I make the following assumption for simplicity:
Assumption 1 q1 = pN > pN−1 > pN−2 > ... > p1 ≥ p0 = q0.
Under this assumption, the expected levels of production are the same for both
individual and team production when all workers exert production eﬀort, be-
cause Nq1 = NpN .
I make this assumption primarily in order to clarify the special eﬀect of team
production, which is not common in the literature. In the standard model of
team production, there is no reason for the ﬁrm to choose team production
in the present case because there is no gain in productivity, and the free-rider
12
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problem acts as an additional cost. Even in the repeated settings of team
production, such as in Che and Yoo (2001), team production is not beneﬁcial
when neither synergy (pN > q1) nor sabotage (p0 < q0) exists in the ﬁrm
(Proposition 4 in Che and Yoo (2001)). My model reveals that the ﬁrm may
choose team production despite this condition.
I further assume supermodularity on pn and p1 = p0:
Assumption 2 pn+2 − pn+1 > pn+1 − pn (for n = 1, ..., N − 2), p1 = p0.
The ﬁrst assumption of supermodularity is standard (see Che and Yoo 2001).
The second assumption is to guarantee that individual workers have no incentive
to work if the others do not exert eﬀort. Although these two conditions are
unnecessary to obtain the main results regarding the existence of equilibrium,
I impose them to exclude the possibility of collusion in the Discussion section.
Given the technology of team production, I particularly focus on an equi-
librium in which the male workers put peer pressure on the parenting female
worker. Although many other equilibria exist, this equilibrium is important
from the viewpoints of both the ﬁrm and the workers. On the one hand, the
ﬁrm has no incentive to choose team production without peer pressure under
the current assumption. Without peer pressure, team production is less ef-
ﬁcient than individual production because of the free rider problem in team
production. The equilibrium with peer pressure is only valuable among the
possible team equilibria from the ﬁrm’s perspective. On the other hand, the
male workers prefer the equilibrium with peer pressure when the compensation
scheme and other policies are appropriately chosen by the ﬁrm. As shown in
the Discussion section, no allocation improves the welfare of all workers even if
they are allowed to collude.
The equilibrium consists of a set of strategies adopted by the ﬁrm and the
workers. The ﬁrm selects the bonus level and the employment policy at the
beginning of the initial period. First, the ﬁrm chooses the minimum level of
bonus, denoted by wT , that induces the workers to exert production eﬀort and
to put peer pressure on the female worker whenever she has a child. Second,
the ﬁrm determines the employment policies. I consider the next strategies on
employment in team equilibrium.
[The employment strategies of the ﬁrm]
1. When some workers quit the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm hires the same number of workers
for each gender subset.
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2. When the female worker has a child and continues to work, the ﬁrm does
not hire any substitute workers.
The strategies of the workers include eﬀort choices (production and peer
pressure), job separation, and childbearing decisions. Because the workers re-
peatedly interact with each other within a team, it is necessary to consider
explicitly a repeated game of the workers. In team production, the workers can
monitor the behaviors of the others within the team; therefore, the strategies of
the workers depend on the history of the actions before the decisions are made.
The strategies of the workers in equilibrium comprise the actions in each
stage that must satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints. In order to
construct the team equilibrium, I ﬁrst provide the strategies on and oﬀ the
equilibrium paths and then investigate whether these strategies are indeed the
best responses in each subgame. On the equilibrium path, all workers staying
in the ﬁrms made production eﬀort in the past. It is noted that three stages are
relevant for the workers in each period: the ﬁrst stage in which fertility decisions
are made, the second stage in which job separation decisions are made, and
the fourth stage in which decisions regarding production and peer pressure are
made. I propose the following set of strategies for each stage in team equilibrium
with peer pressure:
[1. The strategies of the workers on the equilibrium path]
1-a. The ﬁrst stage: If the female worker has the opportunity to bear a child,
she does so when a > ac, where ac ≡ pNwT − e. Otherwise, she abandons the
idea of childbearing.
1-b. The second stage: The female worker quits the ﬁrm if and only if she
bears a child.
1-c. The fourth stage: All workers make production eﬀort.
This set of strategies simply states that all workers make production eﬀort as
long as the female worker follows the social norm of working without a child or
quitting the ﬁrm in the case of childbearing.
Oﬀ the equilibrium path in which some workers do not follow the strategies
prescribed above, some form of peer sanction does arise in the process. The
punishment is conducted in the fourth stage in which the workers select activity
types:
[2. The strategies of the workers oﬀ the equilibrium path]
2-a. Deviation of the female worker: When the female worker either made
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no eﬀort in the past or continues to work after childbearing, all male workers
put peer pressure on her.
2-b. Deviation of the male workers: When some male workers are observed
not to have followed equilibrium strategies in the past, all workers in the team
make no eﬀort.
Given the set of equilibrium strategies of the workers, the ﬁrm appropriately
chooses a bonus level so that the above actions are the best response for the
workers. I show that this is true when the following assumption is imposed on
the size of the team (N) and the probability of childbearing opportunity (θ):
Assumption 3 δh(N − 1) ≥ ep0/(pN − p0), θ ≤ p0/pN .
The ﬁrst condition posits the lower bound on the team size of N , and the large
team size clearly ensures this condition. If the size is small, the eﬀect of peer
pressure is insuﬃcient and the female worker does not quit the ﬁrm even if she
receives peer pressure in equilibrium. The second restriction limits the range
of the probability of childbearing opportunity, θ, and the low probability is
necessary to support the equilibrium. When the probability is high, the female
worker expects to have the opportunity to bear a child in most periods. Hence,
for some value of a, the female worker has an incentive to make no eﬀort in
the anticipation that she can bear a child and quit the ﬁrm in the next period
before receiving peer pressure. Although this does not happen for most values
of a, I impose it to ensure that the equilibrium holds for the entire domain of
a.
The next proposition shows that the above set of strategies constitutes a
team equilibrium with peer pressure when the bonus level of wT is appropriately
chosen.10
Proposition 1 (Team production) Under Assumptions 1-3, the workers’
strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium in team production, given
the bonus level of wT that lies in the following range:
h(N − 1)
p0
≥ wT ≥ e
δ(pN − p0)( ≡ w
2 ).
The female worker abandons the idea of childbearing when a is lower than ac,
where ac = pNw
T − e. Otherwise, she has a child but leaves the ﬁrm.
10All of the omitted proofs are provided in the working paper of this paper (Nosaka 2009).
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It is noted that the range of the bonus is not empty because of Assumption 3.
In order to understand why each action is optimal, I consider several typical
subgames and investigate whether the incentive compatibility conditions hold
in each case.11 I ﬁrst show that the workers have an incentive to engage in
production eﬀort on the equilibrium path; second, I consider the question of
whether they have an incentive to put peer pressure on the parenting female
worker. Finally, I investigate the female worker’s decisions pertaining to optimal
fertility and job separation.
First, I present the incentive problem with respect to production eﬀort on
the equilibrium path. The next incentive compatibility condition for the male
worker is necessary to induce it:12
pNw
T − e ≥ pN−1wT (1− δ) + p0wT δ. (4)
The left-hand side is the expected utility when the male worker makes pro-
duction eﬀort; this expected utility is no less than that on the right-hand side
wherein he makes no eﬀort and obtains pN−1wT in the current period but the
beneﬁt is reduced to p0w
T in the subsequent periods because no workers exert
eﬀort. By direct calculation, this condition implies that the bonus of wT must
be no less than the following critical value of w1:
wT ≥ w1 ≡ e
pN − (1− δ)pN−1 − δp0 . (5)
The bonus of wT always satisﬁes this under the condition of the proposition
because w2 > w1.
Second, I study the punishment stage in which the female worker deviates
and continues to work after childbirth. Male workers then put peer pressure on
her. The next condition provides them with a suﬃcient incentive to do this:
(p0w
T − e)(1− δ) + (pNwT − e)δ ≥ p0wT . (6)
The left-hand side denotes the value when the male workers put peer pressure
on the parenting female worker. In the peer sanction period, the male workers
exert eﬀort for peer pressure; thus, the probability of success is low as reﬂected
11Here, I do not describe all of the subgames in order to simplify the exposition. Refer to
Nosaka (2009) for the complete analysis.
12The situation is slightly diﬀerent for the female worker; refer to the Appendix in Nosaka
(2009) for this issue.
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by the ﬁrst term. Productivity, however, increases in the subsequent periods
because the parenting female worker is replaced by a new female worker without
a child, and this gain is represented by high productivity in the second term.
The value of the left-hand side is no less than that of the right-hand side wherein
a male worker deviates and exerts no eﬀort (and no workers provide production
eﬀort in the subsequent periods). After some manipulation, this constraint is
equivalent to the condition that the bonus of wT is no less than the critical
value of w2 in the proposition; this condition obviously holds by assumption.
Moreover, the punishment phase arises as soon as some male workers devi-
ate from the equilibrium strategies. None of the workers then exerts productive
eﬀort in the subsequent periods. These strategies are the best response if the
strategy leads to a Nash equilibrium of a stage game. The incentive compati-
bility condition to support it is
p0w
T ≥ p1wT − e.
This is always true under Assumption 2.
Lastly, I investigate the fertility decision of the female worker. This decision
determines the critical level of the utility of childcare, denoted by ac, below
which the female worker abandons the idea of childbearing in equilibrium.13
Because the female worker quits the ﬁrm after she bears a child in equilibrium,
she can choose either to quit the ﬁrm with a child or to remain in the ﬁrm
without a child. The female worker quits the ﬁrm if a ≥ pNwT − e; otherwise,
she abandons the idea of childbearing. Thus, the critical value of a is obtained
when this inequality holds with equality, and it is ac in the proposition.
Given the equilibrium strategies of workers that support peer sanctions
against deviators, the ﬁrm selects the level of bonus that minimizes the la-
bor cost. The optimal level is clearly the minimum level of w2 if peer pressure
is preferable to the ﬁrm, and I focus on such a case.14 As a consequence, the
13I omit the other decisions of the female worker for simple exposition. They are decisions
regarding production eﬀort and job separation, and the full analysis is detailed in the Appendix
of Nosaka (2009).
14In order to locate the optimal level of bonus, the ﬁrm needs to know the consequences
when it proposes a bonus below w2. In order to make this choice less attractive, I assume
that no workers engage in production eﬀort if the ﬁrm makes such an oﬀer. This strategy
clearly constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the stage game and thus a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. Because the proﬁt is clearly lower in this case than in the equilibrium one, the
ﬁrm provides a bonus of at least w2.
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optimal bonus is
wT = w2 =
e
δ(pN − p0) . (7)
It is noted that peer pressure—a determinant of w2—requires a cost in
addition to the implementation cost for production eﬀort that dictates w1,
because w1 < w2. In standard repeated settings such as Che and Yoo (2001),
the relevant constraint is only on production eﬀort, and the constraint on peer
pressure is absent. In this sense, team production with peer pressure requires
a higher wage than team production without it.
The expected total labor cost is the expected level of bonus multiplied by
the employment size of N in team equilibrium. In team production, the ﬁrm
employs only N workers because the female worker quits the ﬁrm in the case
of childbearing and the ﬁrm need not employ a substitute worker. As a conse-
quence, the total labor cost is
NpNw
T =
NpNe
δ(pN − p0) . (8)
2.4 Optimal organization
The ﬁrm chooses the type of organization that provides the lowest total labor
cost. The next proposition reveals that this trade-oﬀ is aﬀected by the discount
factor of δ.
Proposition 2 The ﬁrm chooses team production if the following condition
holds:
N < δ
( θ
1− δ(1− θ) +N
)
.
Otherwise, the ﬁrm adopts individual production.
Proof. According to the deﬁnitions of the labor cost in (3) and (8), the labor cost
of team production is lower if:
NpNe
δ(pN − p0) <
( θ
1− (1− θ)δ +N
) q1
q1 − q0 e. (9)
Because pN = q1 and p0 = q0, this condition is identical to the inequality in the
proposition. Q.E.D.
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The discount factor dictates the optimal organization within a ﬁrm. The
right-hand side of the inequality in the proposition is an increasing function
of the discount factor, and team production is always better when δ = 1.
For a high level of the discount factor, the ﬁrm can induce workers to make
production eﬀort and exert peer pressure at a low cost because the workers
place more emphasis on the future payoﬀ and the future peer sanction works
more eﬀectively. Team production is thus less costly for a high value of the
discount factor, and this fact leads to a cost advantage of team production over
individual production as formalized in the proposition.
3 Discussion
3.1 Properties of compensation
The equilibrium with peer pressure in the last section is one of the many possible
equilibria in team production, but it has a special property: all male workers
cannot improve their welfare over the equilibrium payoﬀ through collusion when
no monetary transfer is allowed among the workers.15 Thus, the male workers
have no incentive to coordinate their behaviors in the equilibrium. The next
proposition summarizes the main result.16
Proposition 3 Suppose that team production with peer pressure is employed
in equilibrium. Then, some male workers are worse oﬀ in any other allocation
compared with the equilibrium one, given the equilibrium strategy of the ﬁrm.
This result is in some sense an extension of Che and Yoo (2001) to the
case of N workers; however, the result diﬀers because I introduce an additional
agent, the female worker. It is clear that she prefers to stay in the ﬁrm and thus
has an incentive to make a side contract with the male workers to stop any peer
pressure. The side contract, however, does not provide the male workers with
15When monetary transfers are possible, the female worker who gains from childbearing
can oﬀer such transfers to the male workers in order to continue to work after childbearing.
I exclude the possibility of a transfer in this section for two reasons. First, child rearing
provides nonpecuniary beneﬁts, and such beneﬁts cannot be directly transferred. Second,
monetary transfers are limited under the liquidity constraint. Moreover, collusion is unable
to improve the equilibrium payoﬀ when the beneﬁt of childbearing, a, is low even if the utility
is transferable.
16The proof is available in Nosaka (2009).
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suﬃcient beneﬁt to turn around their equilibrium behaviors when a monetary
transfer among workers is not available.
The ﬁrm’s policy regarding no substitute workers in the case of childbearing
plays a decisive role in this collusion proofness. In order to address why this
strategy is critical, I assume, contrary to the equilibrium, that the ﬁrm employs
a substitute worker after the female worker bears a child. Then, the payoﬀs of
the male workers are unchanged even if the parenting female worker continues to
work because her low productivity is compensated for by the substitute worker.
On the contrary, the female worker gains greatly if she can stay in the ﬁrm
after having a child. As a consequence, when the substitute worker is available,
there exists a side contract that raises the welfare of the female worker, keeping
that of the other workers unchanged.
3.2 Welfare
The present model reveals the possibility of a signiﬁcant welfare loss in team
production. In team production, the ﬁrm devises a compensation scheme such
that the female worker can abandon the idea of childbearing in order to save
the labor cost. In individual production, on the contrary, no such eﬀects exist
in equilibrium. As a result, individual production provides a higher level of
welfare because of the beneﬁt of child rearing.
This welfare result is formalized by the following proposition.17
Proposition 4 (Welfare) Equilibrium is eﬃcient in individual production.
Equilibrium in team production is eﬃcient if a ≥ ac and ineﬃcient if a < ac.
It is noted that the team equilibrium is less eﬃcient only if a < ac, where
women abandon the idea of childbearing.
The literature has examined both the beneﬁts and the costs of team produc-
tion or joint performance compensation, and this study presents the additional
negative aspects of team production. The free rider problem is a typical nega-
tive aspect of team production (Holmstrom 1982); however, subsequent studies
have investigated many positive aspects of team production, especially focus-
ing on coordination, peer monitoring, and synergy among workers within a
team (Che and Yoo 2001). My model thus presents a negative aspect of team
production that is attributable to peer monitoring.
17The proof is available in Nosaka (2009).
20
46
3.3 Policy implications
In this subsection, I investigate the robustness of the main results and the
eﬀects of labor legislation. I in particular focus upon the three assumptions of
the model: the high level of compensation for parenting women, introduction
of substitute workers, and availability of other labor contracts.18
I start with the discussion of the eﬀects of compensation for parenting
women. In the basic model, the compensation of a parenting female worker
is the same as that of her coworkers even after childbearing. The compensation
levels, however, are in general lower after childbirth. In order to address this
issue, I introduce modiﬁed labor legislation under which the legally mandated
compensation of the parenting female worker, denoted by bm, is lower than that
of her male counterparts.19
When compensation reduces, the ﬁrm may prefer individual to team pro-
duction for the following two reasons. First, the ﬁrm directly saves the labor
cost for the parenting female worker in individual production. Second, even in
individual production, the female worker may choose her job over childbearing
in order to avoid low compensation. However, even in the cases of low compen-
sation during parenting periods, team production may still be a better option
for ﬁrms when bm has some positive lower bound. This is particularly true
when the discount factor (δ) is high.20
I then consider the role of substitute workers in the model. Since the intro-
duction of substitute workers makes team production less attractive, I am able
to consider the new requirement that mandates a substitute worker to support
the female worker who bears a child. However, the introduction of a substitute
worker itself does not alter the equilibrium strategy of the workers in team
production. Each worker engages in peer pressure activities because it is his
or her best response to the condition that the other workers do the same. The
optimal strategies are unchanged even if a new substitute worker is introduced.
Because the source of equilibrium lies in coordination among the workers, all
of them have to coordinate and alter their behaviors. Coordinated changes in
the workers’ behaviors are thus required to alter the equilibrium.
This model’s prediction is therefore consistent with recent empirical evi-
18The detailed discussion is provided in Nosaka (2009).
19This implies that bm < q1w, where w is the bonus paid when performance is successful
and depends on the way in which production is organized within the ﬁrm.
20In Nosaka (2009), I discussed the detailed conditions on the proﬁtability of team produc-
tion in this case.
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dence that family policies that aim to raise fertility are more eﬀective when
combined with other remedies that alter the attitude and coordinated behav-
iors of all the workers within a ﬁrm as stated in the Introduction (Staines and
Galinsky 1992). My model also indicates that the team leader is crucial to suc-
cessful policy reform because he or she occupies a position capable of aﬀecting
coordination among workers within the team.
As the last topic for discussion, I consider the availability of other labor
contracts in the model. The ﬁrm and female worker may make binding contracts
that may be contingent on their choices. For example, the female worker may
accept a low bonus before and after childbearing or pay any entrance fee in
exchange for the introduction of individual production or any arrangements
that eliminate peer pressure.
I argue that these arrangements are less likely to be feasible from several
viewpoints. First, labor legislation or legal constraints such as the minimum
wage law and equal employment law prevent such arrangements. Although some
bilateral contracts are possible, these agreements are not enforceable because
no third party would implement these illegal agreements. Second, there exist
many informational and ﬁnancial constraints that make the contract diﬃcult.
For example, workers are unable to pay the entrance fee when hired because of
the liquidity constraint. Third, it is costly to negotiate over how production is
organized when the ﬁrm hires female workers.21
4 Conclusion
This study investigates the eﬀect of organization and norms within a ﬁrm on
the job separation decisions of working women. When labor legislation ensures
the employment and wage compensation of the parenting female worker during
child rearing, the ﬁrm has an incentive to introduce team production in order
to gain the beneﬁt from peer monitoring. In team production, it is in the
best interests of workers to put peer pressure on parenting female workers so
that these women quit their jobs voluntarily. This threat of indirect dismissal
forces the female worker to choose between job separation with a child and
working without a child, which leads to a high opportunity cost of childbearing.
Moreover, the allocation can be ineﬃcient in team production from the social
standpoint because the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt without taking into account the
21These costs include those of negotiation with male workers.
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social beneﬁt of child rearing. With regard to policy implications, I argue
that simple policies aimed at raising fertility may be ineﬀective because it is
optimal for workers to put peer pressure on the parenting female worker as
long as the other workers do the same. The coordinated change in behaviors,
in addition to the reform of legislation, is critical to break the equilibrium with
peer pressure. While the model is too simple to include the complex aspects of
labor legislation and institutions, I believe that social norms are more or less
created endogenously by the optimal decisions of economic agents.
(Professor of Economics, Labor Economics)
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